6 Reasons Why Australia Won't Get Nuclear Weapons

Christine Leah and Crispin Rovere argued in their recent article that In a high-intensity conflict between the United States and China, it is conceivable that China may target Australia with long-range nuclear missiles as a step up the escalation ladder, and that [i]n this eventuality, extended nuclear deterrence would hardly be credible. From this tautologybecause in case of an attack, extended deterrence would of course have failedthey deduce that the most effective means for Canberra to dissuade Beijing from such an escalatory step, and to assist the United States in Asia, is to develop or acquire its own reliable long-range nuclear deterrent. They continue that while many would consider this a bad idea (as such a step would potentially have proliferation knock-on effects with other U.S. allies such as Japan and South Korea), the nations in Southeast Asia will see Australia as a more capable strategic partner and deepen cooperation. Moreover, Leah and Rovere assert that Australia would be legally entitled to nuclear weapons given its role in British nuclear tests before the signature of the NPT, and assert that if the U.S. would publicly recognize this, Australia could then leverage its position in present nuclear arms control negotiations, further persuading countries in the region to exercise nuclear restraint.