TY - JOUR
T1 - A forward looking decision rule for imprecise credences
AU - Sud, Rohan
PY - 2014/1
Y1 - 2014/1
N2 - Adam Elga (Philosophers' Imprint, 10(5), 1-11, 2010) presents a diachronic puzzle to supporters of imprecise credences and argues that no acceptable decision rule for imprecise credences can deliver the intuitively correct result. Elga concludes that agents should not hold imprecise credences. In this paper, I argue for a two-part thesis. First, I show that Elga's argument is incomplete: there is an acceptable decision rule that delivers the intuitive result. Next, I repair the argument by offering a more elaborate diachronic puzzle that is more difficult for imprecise Bayesians to avoid.
AB - Adam Elga (Philosophers' Imprint, 10(5), 1-11, 2010) presents a diachronic puzzle to supporters of imprecise credences and argues that no acceptable decision rule for imprecise credences can deliver the intuitively correct result. Elga concludes that agents should not hold imprecise credences. In this paper, I argue for a two-part thesis. First, I show that Elga's argument is incomplete: there is an acceptable decision rule that delivers the intuitive result. Next, I repair the argument by offering a more elaborate diachronic puzzle that is more difficult for imprecise Bayesians to avoid.
KW - Decision theory
KW - Formal epistemology
KW - Imprecise credences
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84891636906&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s11098-013-0235-2
DO - 10.1007/s11098-013-0235-2
M3 - Article
SN - 0031-8116
VL - 167
SP - 119
EP - 139
JO - Philosophical Studies
JF - Philosophical Studies
IS - 1
ER -