TY - GEN
T1 - A game theoretic approach to sensor data communications in an opportunistic network
AU - Wennerstrom, Hjalmar
AU - Smith, David B.
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2015 IEEE.
PY - 2015/9/9
Y1 - 2015/9/9
N2 - Opportunistic communication coupled with a sensing task enables the collection and spreading of sensory information in areas without global connectivity, providing useful information in challenging environments. In this paper, we consider an opportunistic sensor network where the mobility of users enables both the measurement and spreading of sensor data. We motivate user participation through a game theoretic approach, which is designed to ensure a fair and efficient exchange of sensor messages. The message exchange is modeled as a two-player game where sensor measurements are exchanged between nodes in a contrite tit-for-tat manner. The proposed game captures the nodes desire to limit energy consumption while at the same time obtaining messages containing useful information. We show that the best response in the game is a Pareto optimal subgame perfect equilibrium. The game is evaluated through simulation in a realistic scenario and compared with three other approaches, generating the best overall efficiency by striking a balance between size and content of messages.
AB - Opportunistic communication coupled with a sensing task enables the collection and spreading of sensory information in areas without global connectivity, providing useful information in challenging environments. In this paper, we consider an opportunistic sensor network where the mobility of users enables both the measurement and spreading of sensor data. We motivate user participation through a game theoretic approach, which is designed to ensure a fair and efficient exchange of sensor messages. The message exchange is modeled as a two-player game where sensor measurements are exchanged between nodes in a contrite tit-for-tat manner. The proposed game captures the nodes desire to limit energy consumption while at the same time obtaining messages containing useful information. We show that the best response in the game is a Pareto optimal subgame perfect equilibrium. The game is evaluated through simulation in a realistic scenario and compared with three other approaches, generating the best overall efficiency by striking a balance between size and content of messages.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84953739303&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/ICC.2015.7249329
DO - 10.1109/ICC.2015.7249329
M3 - Conference contribution
T3 - IEEE International Conference on Communications
SP - 6306
EP - 6311
BT - 2015 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2015
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2015
Y2 - 8 June 2015 through 12 June 2015
ER -