Abstract
Physicalism is a thesis in metaphysics: the nature of the mind and its states are such that we need no more than the physical properties to give a complete account of them. According to a priori physicalism, this thesis in metaphysics implies a thesis about a priori entailment. If the thesis in metaphysics is true, a sufficiently rich account of a subject-you, me, or. .. -given in physical terms a priori entails how that subject is mentally. Why do some physicalists want to make things difficult for themselves by embracing a priori physicalism; why do they believe that a posteriori physicalism-a prima facie less demanding version of physicalism-is not an option? This is the topic of this chapter. As we will see, there are a number of reasons that have or might be given.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Pages | 371-386 |
Number of pages | 16 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9780198749677 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Jan 2020 |