A slightly radical neuron doctrine

F. Jackson

doi:10.1017/S0140525X99342199

A slightly radical neuron doctrine

F. Jackson^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Short survey › peer-review

Abstract

The element of truth in behaviorism tells us that some versions of a radical neuron doctrine must be false. However, the representational nature of many mental states implies that neuroscience may well bear on some topics traditionally addressed by philosophers of mind. An example is the individuation of belief states.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	840-841
Number of pages	2
Journal	Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Volume	22
Issue number	5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X99342199
Publication status	Published - 1999

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title = "A slightly radical neuron doctrine",

abstract = "The element of truth in behaviorism tells us that some versions of a radical neuron doctrine must be false. However, the representational nature of many mental states implies that neuroscience may well bear on some topics traditionally addressed by philosophers of mind. An example is the individuation of belief states.",

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JO - Behavioral and Brain Sciences

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A slightly radical neuron doctrine

Abstract

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