Abstract
In the context of the stable roommates problem, this paper provides an alternative characterization of acyclic instances with n roommates; one that requires checking n - 1 fewer equations than symmetry of the utility functions (Rodrigues-Neto, 2007). We introduce the concepts of agent-cycles and cycle equations and prove that an instance is acyclic if and only if there exists a representation of preferences such that all cycle equations of agent-cycles of length 3 containing an agent i hold. In this case, there is a unique stable matching.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 304-306 |
| Number of pages | 3 |
| Journal | Economics Letters |
| Volume | 118 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Feb 2013 |