Aggregative public good games

Richard Cornes*, Roger Hartley

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

92 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We exploit the aggregative structure of the public good model to provide a simple analysis of the voluntary contribution game. In contrast to the best response function approach, ours avoids the proliferation of dimensions as the number of players is increased, and can readily analyze games involving many heterogeneous players. We demonstrate the approach at work on the standard pure public good model and show how it can analyze extensions of the basic model.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)201-219
Number of pages19
JournalJournal of Public Economic Theory
Volume9
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2007
Externally publishedYes

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