Abstract
This article presents a novel actor-centred theory of transnational authoritarianism that puts the nexus between security and authoritarianism at the heart of its explanation of how and why neighbouring states collude to preserve their respective authoritarian regimes. It proposes the authoritarian security community, in which regionally proximate states of similar power and status form a “no war” community, allowing their security services to actively cooperate in transnational repression. These relations are underpinned by personal networks for both regime security and kleptocratic purposes. In total, the retooled relationships between networks of security actors leverage the authoritarian dividends of an autocratic peace, providing assurance of reduced space for opponents, less prospect of future accountability and more opportunities for material gain. I demonstrate the argument based on the case of the Mekong sub-region of Southeast Asia. The evidence presented in this article suggests the later-joining Mekong members have extended ASEAN's illiberal practices to a new level of subregional collusion, linking up with founding member Thailand in the process. Empirically, the case shows that attributing democratic deconsolidation or autocratic regression in mainland Southeast Asia solely or mainly to the rise of China risks overlooking important local, transnational dynamics that foster authoritarianism.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Number of pages | 22 |
Journal | Democratization |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Accepted/In press - 2025 |
Externally published | Yes |