TY - JOUR
T1 - An ideal Kyoto protocol
T2 - Emissions trading, redistributive transfers and global participation
AU - Caplan, Arthur J.
AU - Cornes, Richard C.
AU - Silva, Emilson C.D.
PY - 2003/4
Y1 - 2003/4
N2 - We demonstrate that an interregional policy scheme featuring trading of carbon dioxide emissions, redistributive resource transfers and global participation, a scheme which we call 'Ideal Kyoto Protocol', yields an efficient equilibrium allocation for a global economy. An altruistic international agency-say, the Global Environment Facility-should operate the resource transfer mechanism. In addition, regional governments should be able to make independent policy commitments regarding how to control regional emissions of carbon dioxide in anticipation of the redistributive transfers. Our efficiency result suggests that the USA should be 'bribed' to reverse its decision of not participating in the Kyoto Protocol.
AB - We demonstrate that an interregional policy scheme featuring trading of carbon dioxide emissions, redistributive resource transfers and global participation, a scheme which we call 'Ideal Kyoto Protocol', yields an efficient equilibrium allocation for a global economy. An altruistic international agency-say, the Global Environment Facility-should operate the resource transfer mechanism. In addition, regional governments should be able to make independent policy commitments regarding how to control regional emissions of carbon dioxide in anticipation of the redistributive transfers. Our efficiency result suggests that the USA should be 'bribed' to reverse its decision of not participating in the Kyoto Protocol.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0037394154&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1093/oep/55.2.216
DO - 10.1093/oep/55.2.216
M3 - Article
SN - 0030-7653
VL - 55
SP - 216
EP - 234
JO - Oxford Economic Papers
JF - Oxford Economic Papers
IS - 2
ER -