Abstract
David Lewis’s position, often called analytic functionalism, was inspired by Ryle’s analytic behaviorism, which took psychological predicates to express complex sets of behavioral dispositions. In this chapter, the author reviews some tenets of Lewis’s philosophy of mind and begins with some comments on the methodology Lewis employed in his analysis of psychological terms, which has become standard in functionalist accounts across philosophy. Then, he discusses the difference between what are often called “realizer functionalism” and “role functionalism,” and argues that Lewis made the wrong choice. In Lewis’s argument for the identity theory, the identity of mental states with biological states follows logically from folk-psychological definitions and broadly physical facts. A central part of folk psychology concerns the interaction of beliefs, desires, and choices. The chapter presents Lewis’s often misunderstood account of intentionality. It also presents few pessimistic remarks on the prospect of analyzing phenomenal truths in terms of functional role.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | A Companion to David Lewis |
Publisher | Wiley |
Pages | 504-518 |
Number of pages | 15 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9781118398593 |
ISBN (Print) | 9781118388181 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Jan 2015 |