Auctions with synergies and asymmetric buyers

Flavio M. Menezes; Paulo K. Monteiro

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2004.04.017

Auctions with synergies and asymmetric buyers

Flavio M. Menezes^*, Paulo K. Monteiro

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

13 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper we consider sequential auctions with synergies where one player wants two objects and the remaining players want one object each. We show that expected prices may not necessarily decrease as predicted by Branco [Econ. Lett. 54 (1997) 159]. Indeed we show that expected prices can actually increase.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	287-294
Number of pages	8
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	85
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2004.04.017
Publication status	Published - Nov 2004

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title = "Auctions with synergies and asymmetric buyers",

abstract = "In this paper we consider sequential auctions with synergies where one player wants two objects and the remaining players want one object each. We show that expected prices may not necessarily decrease as predicted by Branco [Econ. Lett. 54 (1997) 159]. Indeed we show that expected prices can actually increase.",

keywords = "Asymmetric sequential auctions, Synergies",

author = "Menezes, {Flavio M.} and Monteiro, {Paulo K.}",

year = "2004",

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AB - In this paper we consider sequential auctions with synergies where one player wants two objects and the remaining players want one object each. We show that expected prices may not necessarily decrease as predicted by Branco [Econ. Lett. 54 (1997) 159]. Indeed we show that expected prices can actually increase.

KW - Asymmetric sequential auctions

KW - Synergies

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JF - Economics Letters

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Auctions with synergies and asymmetric buyers

Abstract

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