AUKUS could help fill the gaps in ANZUS

What’s the essence of the US–Australia alliance? For the late Des Ball, it lay in close intelligence cooperation. Many would point to Article IV of the ANZUS Treaty, which commits both countries ‘to meet the common danger’ in case of ‘an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties’. Most of the public debate on the implications of Australia’s decision to acquire nuclear-powered submarines under the AUKUS pact indeed focuses on what it might say about Australia’s commitment to stand alongside the US in a conflict. Few, however, would see the essence of the US–Australia alliance in close institutional integration. The absence of institutionalised mechanisms for policy consultation, joint planning and joint capability development has been a notable difference of our US alliance from alliances in the northern hemisphere, notably NATO. But what the decision also demonstrates is the urgent need to have these mechanisms in place—and indeed they may well arise as a fortuitous, if challenging, consequence of it.