Australia’s Archipelagic Deterrence

Andrew Carr*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    2 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Australia’s decision to acquire long-range nuclear-powered submarines, its desire for interchangeable forces with America and the claim by a former defence minister that it would be ‘inconceivable’ for Australia not to be involved in a conflict over Taiwan indicate high ambitions. Archipelagic deterrence better accommodates the political dilemmas of alliance and partner cooperation, and provides the United States with a resilient platform for conducting long-term strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific. In the 1980s, the key one for Australian defence policy was how to justify and design a defence force in the absence of a threat. This led to the ‘Defence of Australia’ strategy, whereby Australia could handle short-term and low-level threats, while cooperating with the US abroad in the case of anything more substantial. Deterrence is a new path for Australia. During the Cold War, Canberra made only ad hoc contributions to the deterrence plans of its partners.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)79-99
    Number of pages21
    JournalSurvival
    Volume65
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 7 Aug 2023

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