Abstract
In this article I show the shortcomings of autonomy-based justifications for exemptions from paternalism and appeal to the value of settling to defend an alternative well-being-based justification. My well-being-based justification, unlike autonomy-based justifications, can (1) explain why adults but not children are exempt from paternalism; (2) show which kinds of paternalism are justified for children; (3) explain the value of the capacity of autonomy; (4) offer a plausible relationship between autonomy and exemption from paternalism; and (5) give political philosophers a justification for exempting persons from paternalism even if broad scepticism about the capacity for autonomy is justified.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 303-325 |
| Number of pages | 23 |
| Journal | Utilitas |
| Volume | 27 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 10 Mar 2015 |
| Externally published | Yes |