Bargaining and the dynamics of divisional norms

Justin P. Bruner

doi:10.1007/s11229-018-1729-4

Bargaining and the dynamics of divisional norms

Justin P. Bruner^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Recently, philosophers have investigated the emergence and evolution of the social contract. Yet extant work is limited as it focuses on the use of simple behavioral norms in rather rigid strategic settings. Drawing on axiomatic bargaining theory, we explore the dynamics of more sophisticated norms capable of guiding behavior in a wide range of scenarios. Overall, our investigation suggests the utilitarian bargaining solution has a privileged status as it has certain stability properties other social arrangements lack.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	407-425
Number of pages	19
Journal	Synthese
Volume	197
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1729-4
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2020

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Bargaining and the dynamics of divisional norms

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