TY - JOUR
T1 - Bayesian beliefs with stochastic monotonicity
T2 - An extension of Machina and Schmeidler
AU - Grant, Simon
AU - Polak, Ben
PY - 2006/9
Y1 - 2006/9
N2 - Machina and Schmeidler show that the probabilistic sophistication can be obtained in an Anscombe-Aumann setting without imposing expected utility by maintaining stochastic monotonicity and adding a new axiom loosely analogous to Savage's P4. This analogous axiom, however, is very strong. In this note, we obtain probabilistic sophistication using a weaker (and more natural) analog of Savage's P4. Stochastic monotonicity is sufficient to bridge the gap, where Anscombe and Aumman use independence twice, we use stochastic monotonicity twice.
AB - Machina and Schmeidler show that the probabilistic sophistication can be obtained in an Anscombe-Aumann setting without imposing expected utility by maintaining stochastic monotonicity and adding a new axiom loosely analogous to Savage's P4. This analogous axiom, however, is very strong. In this note, we obtain probabilistic sophistication using a weaker (and more natural) analog of Savage's P4. Stochastic monotonicity is sufficient to bridge the gap, where Anscombe and Aumman use independence twice, we use stochastic monotonicity twice.
KW - Anscombe-Aumann
KW - Horse/roulette lotteries
KW - Independence
KW - Stochastic monotonicity
KW - Subjective probability
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=33748080151&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jet.2005.03.006
DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2005.03.006
M3 - Article
SN - 0022-0531
VL - 130
SP - 264
EP - 282
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
IS - 1
ER -