Belgium: Delegation and Accountability under Partitocratic Rule

Lieven De Winter*, Patrick Dumont

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Reviews the mechanisms of delegation and accountability in post-war Belgium prior to the major reforms of the 1990s and the subsequent reforms. Discusses how political parties dominate these processes and reduce many actors in the parliamentary chain of delegation (MPs, ministers, civil servants) to mere party agents. Partitocracy is unavoidable and even functional for political system stability in Belgium, but it does come at the cost of undermining political legitimacy and governability.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationDelegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies
PublisherOxford University Press
ISBN (Electronic)9780191602016
ISBN (Print)9780198297840
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 20 Jan 2005
Externally publishedYes

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