Believing and Acting: Voluntary Control and the Pragmatic Theory of Belief

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    Abstract

    I argue that an attractive theory about the metaphysics of beliefthe pragmatic, interpretationist theory endorsed by Stalnaker, Lewis, and Dennett, among othersimplies that agents have a novel form of voluntary control over their beliefs. According to the pragmatic picture, what it is to have a given belief is in part for that belief to be part of an optimal rationalization of your actions. Since you have voluntary control over your actions, and what actions you perform in part determines what beliefs you count as having, this theory entails that you have some voluntary control over your beliefs. However, the pragmatic picture doesn't entail that you can believe something as a result of intention to believe it. Nevertheless, I argue that the limited sort of voluntary control implied by the pragmatic picture may be of use in vindicating the deontological conception of epistemic justification.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)459-513
    JournalLogos & Episteme
    Volume6
    Issue number4
    Publication statusPublished - 2015

    Fingerprint

    Dive into the research topics of 'Believing and Acting: Voluntary Control and the Pragmatic Theory of Belief'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this