Bermúdez on self-consciousness

Brian Garrett

doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00300

Bermúdez on self-consciousness

Brian Garrett^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

I argue that José Luis Bermúdez has not shown that there is a paradox in our concept of selfconsciousness. The deflationary theory is not a plausible theory of self-consciousness, so its paradoxicality is irrelevant. A more plausible theory, 'the simple theory', is not paradoxical. However, I do think there is a puzzle about the connection between self-consciousness and 'I'-thoughts.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	96-101
Number of pages	6
Journal	Philosophical Quarterly
Volume	53
Issue number	210
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00300
Publication status	Published - 2003

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title = "Berm{\'u}dez on self-consciousness",

abstract = "I argue that Jos{\'e} Luis Berm{\'u}dez has not shown that there is a paradox in our concept of selfconsciousness. The deflationary theory is not a plausible theory of self-consciousness, so its paradoxicality is irrelevant. A more plausible theory, 'the simple theory', is not paradoxical. However, I do think there is a puzzle about the connection between self-consciousness and 'I'-thoughts.",

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AB - I argue that José Luis Bermúdez has not shown that there is a paradox in our concept of selfconsciousness. The deflationary theory is not a plausible theory of self-consciousness, so its paradoxicality is irrelevant. A more plausible theory, 'the simple theory', is not paradoxical. However, I do think there is a puzzle about the connection between self-consciousness and 'I'-thoughts.

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U2 - 10.1111/1467-9213.00300

DO - 10.1111/1467-9213.00300

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JO - Philosophical Quarterly

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Bermúdez on self-consciousness

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