TY - GEN
T1 - Bilateral Trade under Information Asymmetry and Quantized Measurements
AU - Farokhi, Farhad
AU - Shames, Iman
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2018 IEEE.
PY - 2018/7/2
Y1 - 2018/7/2
N2 - Bilateral trading games are considered in which the buyer has access to more accurate information about the seller's valuation. The accuracy of the information, acquired by the buyer, is captured using quantization levels. We study how the level of accuracy and the rule for setting the final price in the bilateral trade game change the probability of striking a deal between the parties as well as the expected payoff of various parties. We also quantify the information level that maximizes the gain in the payoff for the smallest price of research assuming that acquiring accurate information is costly.
AB - Bilateral trading games are considered in which the buyer has access to more accurate information about the seller's valuation. The accuracy of the information, acquired by the buyer, is captured using quantization levels. We study how the level of accuracy and the rule for setting the final price in the bilateral trade game change the probability of striking a deal between the parties as well as the expected payoff of various parties. We also quantify the information level that maximizes the gain in the payoff for the smallest price of research assuming that acquiring accurate information is costly.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85062186102&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/CDC.2018.8619518
DO - 10.1109/CDC.2018.8619518
M3 - Conference contribution
T3 - Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
SP - 5832
EP - 5837
BT - 2018 IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2018
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 57th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2018
Y2 - 17 December 2018 through 19 December 2018
ER -