Bipartisanship and bicameralism in australia's ‘war on terror’: forcing limits on the extension of executive power

Phil Larkin*, John Uhr

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    10 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    In Australia, John Howard's coalition government responded to the attacks of September 2001 by introducing a series of bills that would grant the executive and the security services unprecedented new powers in its ‘war on terror’, and by committing troops to Afghanistan and, later, Iraq. Australia governments normally dominate the lower House of Representatives whereas the Senate, with near co-equal powers, elected by proportional representation, and thus usually denying the government or opposition an overall majority, proved to be a more significant obstacle, often requiring the government to make substantial concessions in order to secure passage of its legislation. Following the 2005 General Election, however, Howard's coalition secured a rare Senate majority, which it was anticipated would curtail parliament's ability to block or amend legislation. In the event, the Senate continued to play a role, albeit a diminished one, in shaping Australia's ‘war on terror’.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)239-256
    Number of pages18
    JournalThe Journal of Legislative Studies
    Volume15
    Issue number2-3
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2009

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