Broome on reasoning and rule-following

Philip Pettit

doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0718-z

Broome on reasoning and rule-following

Philip Pettit^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

John Broome’s Rationality Through Reasoning is a trail-blazing study of the nature of rationality, the nature of reasoning and the connection between the two. But it may be somewhat misleading in two respects. First, his theory of reasoning is consistent with the meta-propositional view that he rejects; it develops a broadly similar theory but in much greater detail. And while his discussion of rule-following helps to explain the role of rules in reasoning, it does not constitute a response to the classic problem associated with Wittgenstein and Kripke.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	3373-3384
Number of pages	12
Journal	Philosophical Studies
Volume	173
Issue number	12
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0718-z
Publication status	Published - 1 Dec 2016

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Broome on reasoning and rule-following

Abstract

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