Career concerns and team talent

Kieron Meagher; Suraj Prasad

doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2016.05.019

Career concerns and team talent

Kieron Meagher, Suraj Prasad^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We develop a model of career concerns in teams. We draw a distinction between individual talent which is associated with a member in the team and team talent which is common to all members of the team. With team talent, members have less of an incentive to free ride and effort is more efficient. With team talent, we also show that group incentive pay can yield higher profits than monitoring even when monitoring is costless.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1-17
Number of pages	17
Journal	Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Volume	129
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.05.019
Publication status	Published - 1 Sept 2016

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10.1016/j.jebo.2016.05.019

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Career concerns and team talent

Abstract

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