Causal Decision Theory, Two-Boxing, and Deliberation-Compatibilism: A Reply to Sandgren and Williamson

Toby Charles Penhallurick Solomon*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalComment/debatepeer-review

    Abstract

    The possibility of predetermined choices raises a challenge for Causal Decision Theory [Ahmed 2014b]. Sandgren and Williamson [2021] have recently proposed a response—Selective Causal Decision Theory—that they hope will avoid Ahmed’s counterexamples, maintain (a particular kind of) compatibilism, and endorse universal Two-boxing in Newcomb’s Problem—CDT’s raison d’être. Their proposal does an admirable job of satisfying the first two desiderata. However, in this reply I raise several worries about whether it can satisfy the third.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)620-627
    Number of pages8
    JournalAustralasian Journal of Philosophy
    Volume100
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2022

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