Closed-form solutions to a subclass of continuous stochastic games via symbolic dynamic programming

Shamin Kinathil, Scott Sanner, Nicolás Della Penna

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

    Abstract

    Zero-sum stochastic games provide a formalism to study competitive sequential interactions between two agents with diametrically opposing goals and evolving state. A solution to such games with discrete state was presented by Littman (Littman, 1994). The continuous state version of this game remains unsolved. In many instances continuous state solutions require nonlinear optimisation, a problem for which closedform solutions are generally unavailable. We present an exact closed-form solution to a subclass of zero-sum continuous stochastic games that can be solved as a parameterised linear program by utilising symbolic dynamic programming. This novel technique is applied to calculate exact solutions to a variety of zero-sum continuous state stochastic games.

    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationUncertainty in Artificial Intelligence - Proceedings of the 30th Conference, UAI 2014
    EditorsNevin L. Zhang, Jin Tian
    PublisherAUAI Press
    Pages390-399
    Number of pages10
    ISBN (Electronic)9780974903910
    Publication statusPublished - 2014
    Event30th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, UAI 2014 - Quebec City, Canada
    Duration: 23 Jul 201427 Jul 2014

    Publication series

    NameUncertainty in Artificial Intelligence - Proceedings of the 30th Conference, UAI 2014

    Conference

    Conference30th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, UAI 2014
    Country/TerritoryCanada
    CityQuebec City
    Period23/07/1427/07/14

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