Co-reactive attitudes and the making of moral community

Victoria McGeer*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

44 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

According to P. F. Strawson, the concepts and practices of holding responsible, as animated by reactive attitudes and emotions, do not presuppose libertarian free will but what I call co-reactivity: a sensitivity to the scaffolding structure of reactive emotions that is displayed by most human beings most of the time. Many contemporary cognitive theorists, while paying deference to Strawson, have reverted to the idea that a presumption of libertarian free will is essential to reactive practice. Some treat this presumption as a hopeless error, others as a necessary illusion. This divide between Strawsonians and non-Strawsonians has important research implications for cognitive psychology; but more important still, it has great significance for the theory and practice of corrective justice. The hopeless-error theorists will be drawn to a crude consequentialist view of punishment purged of individual blame, the necessary-illusion theorists to an equally crude retributivist view. By contrast, those of a Strawsonian bent should find themselves drawn to a novel restorative vision which pays due deference to the natural kinematics of reactive emotions.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationEmotions, Imagination, and Moral Reasoning
PublisherTaylor and Francis
Pages299-325
Number of pages27
ISBN (Electronic)9781136631658
ISBN (Print)9781848729001
Publication statusPublished - 4 May 2012
Externally publishedYes

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