Cognitive diversity and moral enhancement

Chris Gyngell, Simon Easteal

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    7 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    One debate in contemporary bioethics centers on whether the development of cognitive enhancement technologies (CETs) will hasten the need for moral enhancement. In this article we provide a new argument in favor of pursuing these enhancement technologies together. The widespread availability of CETs will likely increase population-level cognitive diversity. Different people will choose to enhance different aspects of their cognition, and some won't enhance themselves at all. Although this has the potential to be beneficial for society, it could also result in harms as people become more different from one another. Aspects of our moral psychology make it difficult for people to cooperate and coordinate actions with those who are very different from themselves. These moral failings could be targeted by moral enhancement technologies, which may improve cooperation among individuals. Moral enhancement technologies will therefore help society maximize the benefits, and reduce the costs, associated with widespread access to cognitive enhancements.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)66-74
    Number of pages9
    JournalCambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics
    Volume24
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 4 Dec 2014

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