Computation, consciousness, and "computation and consciousness"

Colin Klein*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

    3 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Video games are a kind of physical computation, and the point holds true of computation more generally. Computationalism about consciousness is the thesis that phenomenal properties supervene on computational ones that is, that being the right kind of computer is enough to be conscious. The mechanism of action of inhalational anesthetics remains something of a scientific puzzle, especially given the ability of chemically inert gasses like xenon to remove consciousness at high concentrations. Tim Maudlin's work bears an important relationship to various 'exploding implementation' arguments, which claim that any sufficiently complex object can implement any finite-state automaton. Maudlin's argument does not require exploding implementation to be true, however. Indeed, he presupposes that appropriate counterfactual restrictions are sufficient to avoid explosions. Maudlin's argument, by contrast, reads computationalism more narrowly as the claim that some Turing machine can be conscious.
    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationThe Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind
    PublisherTaylor and Francis
    Pages297-309
    Number of pages13
    ISBN (Electronic)9781315643670
    ISBN (Print)9781138186682
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Sept 2018

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