Conflicted financial advice: disclosure revisited

Paul Chen*, Martin Richardson

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    4 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    We examine the impact of disclosing an advisor’s conflict of interest in providing financial advice to a client in an experiment. We find that an advisor’s conflict of interest harms the client and that disclosing the conflict harms the advisor. Unlike earlier literature, we do not find that disclosure of the advisor’s conflict of interest results in moral licensing or strategic exaggeration behaviour by the advisor nor, relatedly, that disclosure disadvantages the client.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)826-829
    Number of pages4
    JournalApplied Economics Letters
    Volume25
    Issue number12
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 12 Jul 2018

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