Abstract
India introduced the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) in 2016 with a view to encourage quick and efficient corporate rescue and restructuring. It follows a UK style insolvency professional in possession model rather than a US style debtor in possession model. Within this model, the IBC has introduced some commendable infrastructure like dedicated company law tribunals, a dedicated regulator and strict timelines. However, the implementation and use of the law in the past two years have exposed a few problems. The main problems arise from directors, who are also controlling shareholders (referred to as promoters in India), refusing to cede control of the company. This article examines the problem at the pre-insolvency phase where directors are reluctant to initiate the IBC process and lose control of the company. The article proposes the introduction of a modified Revlon duty when a near insolvent company is seeking bids. This duty will incentivize promoters to act in the interests of reviving the company rather than retaining control to the point of liquidation.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 631-663 |
Journal | UMKC law review |
Volume | 88 |
Issue number | 3 |
Publication status | Published - 2019 |