Corrigendum to "bargaining and boldness" [Games Econ. Beha. 38 (2002) 28-51]

Albert Burgos; Simon Grant; Atsushi Kajii

doi:10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00017-9

Corrigendum to "bargaining and boldness" [Games Econ. Beha. 38 (2002) 28-51]

Albert Burgos, Simon Grant, Atsushi Kajii^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Comment/debate › peer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We show the incompatibility between the existence of stationary subgame perfect equilibria in Shaked's game of cycling offers with exogenous breakdown and the behavior of players consistent with the Allais Paradox. Thus, the strategic support of the equally marginally bold solution presented in Burgos, Grant, and Kajii [2002. Games Econ. Behav. 38, 28-51] does not go beyond the two-person case.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	165-168
Number of pages	4
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	41
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00017-9
Publication status	Published - Oct 2002
Externally published	Yes

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abstract = "We show the incompatibility between the existence of stationary subgame perfect equilibria in Shaked's game of cycling offers with exogenous breakdown and the behavior of players consistent with the Allais Paradox. Thus, the strategic support of the equally marginally bold solution presented in Burgos, Grant, and Kajii [2002. Games Econ. Behav. 38, 28-51] does not go beyond the two-person case.",

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AU - Kajii, Atsushi

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N2 - We show the incompatibility between the existence of stationary subgame perfect equilibria in Shaked's game of cycling offers with exogenous breakdown and the behavior of players consistent with the Allais Paradox. Thus, the strategic support of the equally marginally bold solution presented in Burgos, Grant, and Kajii [2002. Games Econ. Behav. 38, 28-51] does not go beyond the two-person case.

AB - We show the incompatibility between the existence of stationary subgame perfect equilibria in Shaked's game of cycling offers with exogenous breakdown and the behavior of players consistent with the Allais Paradox. Thus, the strategic support of the equally marginally bold solution presented in Burgos, Grant, and Kajii [2002. Games Econ. Behav. 38, 28-51] does not go beyond the two-person case.

KW - Allais paradox

KW - Multilateral sequential bargaining

KW - Subgame perfection

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DO - 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00017-9

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JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

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ER -

Corrigendum to "bargaining and boldness" [Games Econ. Beha. 38 (2002) 28-51]

Abstract

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