Debunking perceptual beliefs about ordinary objects

Daniel Z. Korman

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

35 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Debunking arguments are arguments that aim to undermine some range of beliefs by showing that those beliefs are not appropriately connected to their subject matter. Arguments of this sort rear their heads in a wide variety of domains, threatening beliefs about morality, mathematics, logic, color, and the existence of God. Perceptual beliefs about ordinary objects, however, are widely thought to be invulnerable to such arguments. I will show that this is a mistake. I articulate a debunking argument that purports to undermine our most basic perceptual beliefs. I then challenge a number of responses to the argument, including the “permissivist” response that there are a plenitude of objects before us, virtually guaranteeing the accuracy of our object beliefs.
Original languageEnglish
JournalPhilosophers Imprint
Volume14
Publication statusPublished - 2014
Externally publishedYes

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