Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Procedural Law |
Place of Publication | Online |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Volume | 10 |
Publication status | Published - 2021 |
Abstract
This entry concerns the concept of ‘deference’ and examines how it functions under international law. In ordinary usage, the term deference designates: ‘[s]ubmission to the acknowledged superior claims, skill, judgment, or other qualities, of another … [c]ourteous regard such as is rendered to a superior, or to one to whom respect is due [and] the manifestation of a disposition to yield to the claims or wishes of another’ (Oxford English Dictionary, 2020). This definition indicates that there may be a range of possible focal points, conditions, and justifications for deference. In essence, however, and as explained in further detail below, the concept of deference under international law can be defined to describe a response by one actor to the recognition of another actor’s decision-making authority (Shirlow, 2021). In such situations, deference means that the first (deferring) actor places some weight or relevance on the decision of the second (deferred to) actor in order to reach a decision on a given matter. Deference is therefore closely connected with the concept of ‘authority’, which describes ‘the ability of one actor to use institutional and discursive resources to induce deference from others’ (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004, 5; see similarly Raz, 2009, 136).