Delegation of decisions about change in organizations: The roles of competition, trade, uncertainty, and scale

Kieron J. Meagher, Andrew Wait

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    17 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Using unique establishment-level data, we find that delegation of organizational change is more likely in workplaces that: face a competitive product market, export, have predictable demand, are part of a smaller overall organization, and have fewer workplaces in the firm producing the same output. Surprisingly, we find no significant relationship between import competition and the allocation of decision-making rights within a firm. Our results are robust to a range of specifications and to alternative measures of our key explanatory variables. (JEL D23, L23, L29).

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)709-733
    Number of pages25
    JournalJournal of Law, Economics, and Organization
    Volume30
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Nov 2014

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