Abstract
This chapter examines some of the different uses of 'ought' and 'can' and the purposes they serve. It marks the differences through the introduction of subscripts. There are two main owned 'oughts' that will concern people. One is the 'oughtD' of decisive objective reason and the another one is oughtR: 'ought' of rationality. Versions of OC governing the 'oughtD' of decisive reasons are supported by an Argument from Deliberation with two main premises. The first concerns the aim of deliberation. The second premise concerns the relationship between deliberation about an action. Several defensible 'ought'/'can' principles have been identified. The Arguments from Deliberation and Criticism for these principles do not appeal to either pointlessness or unfairness. The pointlessness argument faces an objection from Truth. The unfairness argument provokes an objection from Self-Shaping. The Demandingness Argument fails to show that the answer to that question is No, using either 'oughtD' of decisive reasons or the 'oughtR' of rationality.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | The Limits of Moral Obligation |
| Subtitle of host publication | Moral Demandingness and Ought Implies Can |
| Publisher | Taylor and Francis Inc. |
| Pages | 147-162 |
| Number of pages | 16 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9781317581291 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9781138824232 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 16 Sept 2015 |
| Externally published | Yes |