Democracy, justice and impartiality

Political agitators from Babeuf or even the Gracchi forward have championed democratization of political structures as a means toward democratization of economic holdings. It usually works, to some extent. When it stops working, someone is usually accused of ‘betraying the revolution’; and there is rarely any shortage of credible candidates. But betrayal is not the only reason that scrupulously democratic procedures fail to promote perfect substantive justice. Here I shall explore conceptual sources of the slippage, and discuss some devices by which democracy might be better aligned with justice. The impartiality connection Analytically, there is a clear link between the concepts of ‘democracy’ and ‘justice’. The link runs through ‘impartiality’, which they both manifest and promote. The same ‘circumstances of impartiality’ are common across both the domain of substantive justice and of procedural democratic fairness: as Brian Barry (1995: 110) says, in passing from the one to the other, ‘what defined fairness there will likewise define fairness here’. Democracy and justice are not interchangeable The appeal of those other two concepts cannot be exhaustively analysed in terms of impartiality, however. If so, justice and democracy would be interchangeable, perfect substitutes for one another. Clearly they are not. Suppose one politician complains that another's proposals are unjust. Were justice and emocracy interchangeable manifestations of impartiality, it would be open to the other to reply: ‘No need for us to argue about justice; let's just call a vote and see what wins’.