Discrimination and Self-Knowledge

Patrick Greenough

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744794.003.0012

Discrimination and Self-Knowledge

Patrick Greenough^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › peer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The chapter shows that a variety of Cartesian Conceptions of the mental are unworkable. In particular, the chapter offers a much weaker conception of limited discrimination than the one advanced by Williamson (2000) and show that this weaker conception, together with some plausible background assumptions, is not only able to undermine the claim that our core mental states are luminous (roughly: if one is in such a state then one is in a position to know that one is) but also the claim that introspection is infallible with respect to our core mental states (where a belief that C obtains is infallible just in case if one believes that C obtains then C obtains). The upshot is a broader and much more powerful case against the Cartesian conception of the mental than has been advanced hitherto.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Introspection and Consciousness
Publisher	Oxford University Press
ISBN (Electronic)	9780199933396
ISBN (Print)	9780199744794
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744794.003.0012
Publication status	Published - 20 Sept 2012
Externally published	Yes

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10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744794.003.0012

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title = "Discrimination and Self-Knowledge",

abstract = "The chapter shows that a variety of Cartesian Conceptions of the mental are unworkable. In particular, the chapter offers a much weaker conception of limited discrimination than the one advanced by Williamson (2000) and show that this weaker conception, together with some plausible background assumptions, is not only able to undermine the claim that our core mental states are luminous (roughly: if one is in such a state then one is in a position to know that one is) but also the claim that introspection is infallible with respect to our core mental states (where a belief that C obtains is infallible just in case if one believes that C obtains then C obtains). The upshot is a broader and much more powerful case against the Cartesian conception of the mental than has been advanced hitherto.",

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AB - The chapter shows that a variety of Cartesian Conceptions of the mental are unworkable. In particular, the chapter offers a much weaker conception of limited discrimination than the one advanced by Williamson (2000) and show that this weaker conception, together with some plausible background assumptions, is not only able to undermine the claim that our core mental states are luminous (roughly: if one is in such a state then one is in a position to know that one is) but also the claim that introspection is infallible with respect to our core mental states (where a belief that C obtains is infallible just in case if one believes that C obtains then C obtains). The upshot is a broader and much more powerful case against the Cartesian conception of the mental than has been advanced hitherto.

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KW - Luminosity

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Discrimination and Self-Knowledge

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