TY - GEN
T1 - Distributed Charging Scheduling and Pricing Strategy for Plug-in Electric Vehicles Based on Stackelberg-Nash and Multi-Cluster Aggregative Games
AU - Jing, Yuhao
AU - Chen, Jianguo
AU - Qiao, Li
AU - Mo, Huadong
AU - Dong, Daoyi
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2024 IEEE.
PY - 2024
Y1 - 2024
N2 - In this paper, we propose a distributed and interactive Plug-in Electric Vehicle (PEV) charging scheduling approach, which is also combined with an optimal pricing strategy. This method tackles challenges such as fluctuations in charging currents, potential supply congestion, and uneven demand distribution that arise as PEV penetration increases. The objective is to improve the robust stability of the charging system while also reducing the costs for PEV users. This study designs a multi-cluster aggregative game mechanism to handle the competitive dynamics among operational clusters and the collective behavior of individual PEVs. Additionally, a strategic pricing method, based on Stackelberg game theory, is designed to refine the determination of basic electricity prices. We further introduce a distributed update method that efficiently seeks the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the hierarchical game described. The effectiveness of the proposed architecture and solution methodology is validated through experimental studies.
AB - In this paper, we propose a distributed and interactive Plug-in Electric Vehicle (PEV) charging scheduling approach, which is also combined with an optimal pricing strategy. This method tackles challenges such as fluctuations in charging currents, potential supply congestion, and uneven demand distribution that arise as PEV penetration increases. The objective is to improve the robust stability of the charging system while also reducing the costs for PEV users. This study designs a multi-cluster aggregative game mechanism to handle the competitive dynamics among operational clusters and the collective behavior of individual PEVs. Additionally, a strategic pricing method, based on Stackelberg game theory, is designed to refine the determination of basic electricity prices. We further introduce a distributed update method that efficiently seeks the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the hierarchical game described. The effectiveness of the proposed architecture and solution methodology is validated through experimental studies.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85217854102&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/SMC54092.2024.10831676
DO - 10.1109/SMC54092.2024.10831676
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85217854102
T3 - Conference Proceedings - IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics
SP - 4704
EP - 4709
BT - 2024 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, SMC 2024 - Proceedings
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 2024 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, SMC 2024
Y2 - 6 October 2024 through 10 October 2024
ER -