Do economic resources play a role in bargaining child care in couples? Parental investment in cases of matching and mismatching gender ideologies in Germany

Natalie Nitsche, Daniela Grunow

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

29 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper examines the factors associated with a gendered division of childcare among parents in Germany. While much is known on the gender division of housework in families and the economic and sociological factors that may be driving it, we still know relatively little about whether and how these factors may affect the division of unpaid childcare in families. We first assess the relevance of partner's combined gender ideologies and relative resources on the division of unpaid childcare. Second, we assess whether the effect of economic resources may be contingent on the partners' agreement or disagreement on gender ideologies concerning maternal employment. We address these questions using data from the German Panel Analysis of Intimate Relationships and Family Dynamics (pairfam) and MLM Growth Curve Models. Our findings consistently show a significant positive effect of partners' combined gender ideologies and her share of income on his share of childcare. These effects are strongest, and robust, among couples with matching ideologies supporting maternal employment, which we term 'egalitarian island' couples. Economically efficient divisions of childcare thus appear dependent upon the couples' ideological pairing and on mothers' ideologies towards maternal employment.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)785-815
Number of pages31
JournalEuropean Societies
Volume20
Issue number5
Early online date7 Jun 2018
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 20 Oct 2018
Externally publishedYes

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