Economic and monetary union: Balancing credibility and legitimacy in an asymmetric policy-mix

Dermot Hodson*, Imelda Maher

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

28 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

There is a double asymmetry in the structure of economic and monetary union (EMU). First, monetary policy is uniform while national economic policies are merely co-ordinated. The credibility of monetary policy is underwritten by an independent European Central Bank, but this is not sufficient as the objective of price stability depends on other aspects of economic policy. Thus greater coordination of national economic policies is needed to secure a credible monetary policy. This highlights the second asymmetry. The emphasis on credibility has been such that due regard has not been given to the legitimacy of the EMU policy architecture. If policy-making is to be effective, credible and legitimate, decision-makers need to pay attention to four key legitimacy indicators: input, output, values and process. It seems inevitable that the success of the developing policy architecture and its effects, both in its monetary and economic dimension, will be judged against these broader standards.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)391-407
Number of pages17
JournalJournal of European Public Policy
Volume9
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2002
Externally publishedYes

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