Abstract
Epistemic paternalism is the practice of interfering with someone's inquiry, without their consent, for their own epistemic good. In this chapter, I explore the relationship between epistemic paternalism and two other epistemological theses: epistemic permissivism and standpoint epistemology. I argue that examining this relationship is fruitful because it sheds light on a series of cases in which epistemic paternalism is unjustified and brings out notable similarities between epistemic permissivism and standpoint epistemology.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Epistemic Paternalism: Conceptions, Justifications and Implications |
| Editors | Amiel Bernal & Guy Axtell |
| Place of Publication | tbc |
| Publisher | Rowman and Littlefield |
| Pages | 203-217 |
| Volume | 1 |
| Edition | 1st |
| ISBN (Print) | 978-1-78661-573-2 |
| Publication status | Published - 2020 |