TY - JOUR
T1 - Evolutionary debunking arguments and the reliability of moral cognition
AU - Fraser, Benjamin James
PY - 2014/3
Y1 - 2014/3
N2 - Recent debate in metaethics over evolutionary debunking arguments against morality has shown a tendency to abstract away from relevant empirical detail. Here, I engage the debate about Darwinian debunking of morality with relevant empirical issues. I present four conditions that must be met in order for it to be reasonable to expect an evolved cognitive faculty to be reliable: the environment, information, error, and tracking conditions. I then argue that these conditions are not met in the case of our evolved faculty for moral judgement.
AB - Recent debate in metaethics over evolutionary debunking arguments against morality has shown a tendency to abstract away from relevant empirical detail. Here, I engage the debate about Darwinian debunking of morality with relevant empirical issues. I present four conditions that must be met in order for it to be reasonable to expect an evolved cognitive faculty to be reliable: the environment, information, error, and tracking conditions. I then argue that these conditions are not met in the case of our evolved faculty for moral judgement.
KW - Error theory
KW - Evolution of morality
KW - Evolutionary debunking argument
KW - Reliabilism
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84894619444&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s11098-013-0140-8
DO - 10.1007/s11098-013-0140-8
M3 - Article
SN - 0031-8116
VL - 168
SP - 457
EP - 473
JO - Philosophical Studies
JF - Philosophical Studies
IS - 2
ER -