Evolutionary debunking arguments and the reliability of moral cognition

Benjamin James Fraser

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    26 Citations (Scopus)


    Recent debate in metaethics over evolutionary debunking arguments against morality has shown a tendency to abstract away from relevant empirical detail. Here, I engage the debate about Darwinian debunking of morality with relevant empirical issues. I present four conditions that must be met in order for it to be reasonable to expect an evolved cognitive faculty to be reliable: the environment, information, error, and tracking conditions. I then argue that these conditions are not met in the case of our evolved faculty for moral judgement.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)457-473
    Number of pages17
    JournalPhilosophical Studies
    Issue number2
    Publication statusPublished - Mar 2014


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