TY - JOUR
T1 - Evolutionary Hypotheses and Moral Skepticism
AU - Isserow, Jessica
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2018, Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature.
PY - 2019/10/1
Y1 - 2019/10/1
N2 - Proponents of evolutionary debunking arguments aim to show that certain genealogical explanations of our moral faculties, if true, undermine our claim to moral knowledge. Criticisms of these arguments generally take the debunker’s genealogical explanation for granted. The task of the anti-debunker is thought to be that of reconciling the (supposed) truth of this hypothesis with moral knowledge. In this paper, I shift the critical focus instead to the debunker’s empirical hypothesis and argue that the skeptical strength of an evolutionary debunking argument is dependent upon the evidence for that hypothesis—evidence which, upon further inspection, proves far from compelling. Following that, however, I suggest that the same considerations which spell trouble for the empirical hypotheses of traditional debunking arguments can also be taken to give rise to an alternative—and better supported—style of debunking argument.
AB - Proponents of evolutionary debunking arguments aim to show that certain genealogical explanations of our moral faculties, if true, undermine our claim to moral knowledge. Criticisms of these arguments generally take the debunker’s genealogical explanation for granted. The task of the anti-debunker is thought to be that of reconciling the (supposed) truth of this hypothesis with moral knowledge. In this paper, I shift the critical focus instead to the debunker’s empirical hypothesis and argue that the skeptical strength of an evolutionary debunking argument is dependent upon the evidence for that hypothesis—evidence which, upon further inspection, proves far from compelling. Following that, however, I suggest that the same considerations which spell trouble for the empirical hypotheses of traditional debunking arguments can also be taken to give rise to an alternative—and better supported—style of debunking argument.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85044718718&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s10670-018-9993-8
DO - 10.1007/s10670-018-9993-8
M3 - Article
SN - 0165-0106
VL - 84
SP - 1025
EP - 1045
JO - Erkenntnis
JF - Erkenntnis
IS - 5
ER -