Exceptions in Nonderivative Value

Garrett Cullity*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Sid is pleased, lets suppose. Is that good? Philosophers of value give three different responses to that question: Yes, No, and It depends. On the third of these views, the answer depends on what Sid is pleased by. If what pleases him is the fine weather, then Yes, his being pleased is good; but if it is someone elses agony, No. On the second, Sids being pleased by the fine weather is good, and his being pleased by suffering is bad, but his just being pleased is evaluatively inadequate. However, the first view answers Yes. Sids being pleased by suffering is bad; but his being pleased is nonderivatively good, no matter what he is pleased by. This is the Mainstream View about the value of pleasure: Plato, Brentano, Sidgwick, Moore, Ewing, Frankena, Chisholm, Lemos and Hurka all hold it.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)26-49
Number of pages24
JournalPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume98
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2019
Externally publishedYes

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