Abstract
This paper evaluates the prospects of harnessing "anti-individualism" about the contents of perceptual states to give an account of the epistemology of perception, making special reference to Tyler Burge's (2003) paper, "Perceptual Entitlement". I start by clarifying what kind of warrant is provided by perceptual experience, and I go on to survey different ways one might explain the warrant provided by perceptual experience in terms of anti-individualist views about the individuation of perceptual states. I close by motivating accounts which instead give a more prominent role to consciousness.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 243-261 |
Number of pages | 19 |
Journal | Erkenntnis |
Volume | 76 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Mar 2012 |
Externally published | Yes |