Externalism and the gappy content of hallucination

Susanna Schellenberg*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

16 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

There are powerful reasons to think of perceptual content as determined at least in part by the environment of the perceiving subject. Externalist views such as this are often rejected on grounds that they do not give a good account of hallucinations. The chapter shows that this reason for rejecting content externalism is not well founded if we embrace a moderate externalism about content, that is, an externalist view on which content is only in part dependent on the experiencing subject“s environment. The chapter starts by motivating content externalism. It then argues that hallucinations are best understood in terms of a deficiency of veridical perceptual experiences. The chapter discusses the consequences of this thesis by developing a view of hallucinations that is committed to externalism about content.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationHallucination
Subtitle of host publicationPhilosophy and Psychology
PublisherMIT Press
Pages291-312
Number of pages22
ISBN (Electronic)9780262315050
ISBN (Print)9780262019200
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2013
Externally publishedYes

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