Firm characteristics and influence on government rule-making: Theory and evidence

Emma Aisbett, Carol McAusland*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    14 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    An adversarial game is used to model a firm's intrinsic and exerted influence over a regulator. Data from the World Business Environment Survey provide strong evidence in support of model hypotheses across a wide range of government agents, countries, and regulatory areas. Of particular relevance to public debate, the theory and econometric analysis show that large firms are more likely to be influential and to benefit from subsidies and low tax constraints. However, large firms are also likely to face greater regulatory constraint from environmental and safety rules.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)214-235
    Number of pages22
    JournalEuropean Journal of Political Economy
    Volume29
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - Mar 2013

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