First-person interventions and the meta-problem of consciousness

Colin Klein*, Andrew B. Barron

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    1 Citation (Scopus)


    Chalmers’ (2018) meta-problem of consciousness emphasizes unexpected common ground between otherwise incompatible positions. We argue that the materialist should welcome discussion of the meta-problem. We suggest that the core of the metaproblem is the seeming arbitrariness of subjective experience. This has an unexpected resolution when one moves to an interventionist account of scientific explanation: the same interventions that resolve the hard problem should also resolve the meta-problem.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)82-90
    Number of pages9
    JournalJournal of Consciousness Studies
    Issue number5-6
    Publication statusPublished - 2020


    Dive into the research topics of 'First-person interventions and the meta-problem of consciousness'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this