Framework for the future? Exploring the possibility of majority voting in the climate negotiations

Luke Kemp*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    17 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is struggling in its attempts to address the threat of anthropogenic climate change and create an effective international climate agreement. A substantial part of the problem is consensus decision-making within the Convention. Majority voting is a potential alternative which is already being discussed within the UNFCCC. A comparative analysis of consensus and majority voting suggests that majority voting is superior in terms of both efficiency and effectiveness by allowing for quicker decision-making and semi-global approaches to a climate agreement (termed here as “Critical Mass Governance”). This paper aims to investigate how majority voting could be implemented in the UNFCCC and to consider politically feasible and effective approaches to voting arrangements for the Convention. There is a legal opportunity to introduce voting through adoption of the draft Rules of Procedure, but this faces political opposition. A type of Layered Majority Voting with larger majorities for financial and substantial matters is considered to be the optimal approach in balancing political feasibility and effectiveness. For now, voting is not politically feasible for the UNFCCC, but could be introduced into future bodies or treaties under the Convention.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)757-779
    Number of pages23
    JournalInternational Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics
    Volume16
    Issue number5
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Oct 2016

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