From 'Consciousness' to 'I Think, I Feel, I Know'

Anna Wierzbicka

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    Abstract

    David Chalmers appears to assume that we can meaningfully discuss what goes on in human heads without paying any attention to the words in which we couch our statements. This paper challenges this assumption and argues that the initial problem is that of metalanguage: if we want to say something clear and valid about us humans, we must think about ourselves outside conceptual English created by one particular history and culture and try to think from a global, panhuman point of view. This means that instead of relying on untranslatable English words such as 'consciousness' and 'experience' we must try to rely on panhuman concepts expressed in crosstranslatable words such as THINK, KNOW, and FEEL (Wierzbicka, 2018). The paper argues that after 'a hundred years of consciousness studies' it is time to try to say something about us (humans), about how we think and how we differ from cats and bats, in words that are clear, stable, and human rather than parochially English.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)257-269
    JournalJournal of Consciousness Studies
    Volume26
    Issue number9-Oct
    Publication statusPublished - 2019

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